Establishing A State System of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials (SSAC): Key to Implementing Safeguard

Abstract

ESTABLISHING A STATE SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR; AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS (SSAC): KEY TO IMPLEMENTING SAFEGUARDS A state system for accounting and control (SSAC) of nuclear materials is a vital element for enforcing international safeguards which is in line with article 7 of the nuclear safeguards agreement which states that “ the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under the agreement and that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear devices.”.Against this tapestry, the IAEA organized a six day training course in SSAC to provide its regional participants with knowledge necessary to strengthening safeguards systems of their various states. For the purpose of safeguards, nuclear materials are anything that contains Uranium, Thorium and Plutonium in any physical or chemical form and in any quantities. A typical SSAC has a national objective, to account for or control nuclear material within the state whilst contributing its quota to the detection of possible losses or unauthorized removal of nuclear materials and an international objective to particularly provide the essential basis for implementation of IAEA safeguards under the provisions of the agreement between the state and the IAEA. It is also important to note that a successful SSAC has two levels; the state and the facility level. The organizational and functional elements of an SSAC at the state level are addressed in six major areas namely; Authority and Responsibility(addressing a state’s SSAC objective and accounting, control and notification procedures for nuclear materials in line with national and IAEA standards); Laws and Regulations(covering legal enactments and information on nuclear materials within the jurisdiction of the state); Information systems(designing and maintaining an information system to collect, record and process information on nuclear materials provided by facility operators and reporting to state authority while handling inter-state and IAEA communications); Establishment of requirements(bordering on requirements and criteria for establishments of an SSAC); the Compliance and Technical support areas cover measurement, categorization, record and report system and applications for containment, disposal and transfer of nuclear materials at the state and international level. It is pertinent to state that it is at the compliance and technical support area that the state and facility must work hand in hand to ensure optimal functionality and the technical requirements of an SSAC varies based on the amount and nature of nuclear material involved. In conclusion, establishment of a viable SSAC requires political commitment, a comprehensive legal framework, trained personnel at the state and facility level and proper record keeping. At present, Nigeria’s safeguard status is quite impressive having signed and enforced various safeguards legislations with the IAEA and other international agencies allied to the development of peaceful use of nuclear resources. However, the country does not have an SSAC regulation but is making efforts to collect data on depleted uranium within its jurisdiction while keeping records and training personnel at the state and facility levels. On this note, it is recommended that the NNRA should develop an SSAC regulation and send officers of safeguard and physical security to Regulatory countries with a well established SSAC.

Adamu Abdul